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The concept  of  net  national emissions  suggests  that accumulation of carbon in forestry  
should be  taken into account  when countries buy  CO2 permits  or  pay  CO2  taxes. The 
paper analyses  the  question  of  the correct  tax/subsidy  programme for  giving  proper 
incentives to forest owners  and utilizers of  wood. The analysis  uses  a  dynamic general  
equilibrium  model with productive  capital  and  the stock  of  forests  as  state  variables. It 
turns out  that in a  decentralized economy forest  owners  should be  subsidized and  CO2 
emissions  should be taxed independently  of  whether they  originates  from wood or  fossil 
fuels. 
Kansainväliset  hiilidioksidipäästöjen  vähentämissopimukset  voivat velvoittaa sopimuksen  
hyväksyviä  maita maksamaan hiilidioksidiveroa,  ostamaan  hiilidioksidin päästöoikeuksia  
tai  pitämään  päästönsä  sovitulla tasolla.  Käsitteen "maakohtaiset nettopäästöt"  mukaan 
hiilidioksidin kertyminen  puubiomassaan  olisi  otettava  huomioon maakohtaisten päästöjen  
määrää arvioitaessa.  Tutkimuksessa etsitään  taloudellisesti tehokasta vero-/tukipolitiikkaa,  
joka  ohjaisi  metsänomistajia  ja  puumateriaalin  käyttäjiä  toimimaan kansantalouden 
kokonaisedun mukaisesti. Analyysi  perustuu pitkän  aikavälin optimikasvumalliin,  johon  on 
lisätty  talouden käytettävissä  olevaa kokonaispuumäärää  kuvaava  varantomuuttuja.  
Lisäksi  otetaan  huomioon hiilen metsäbiomassaan sitoutumisen dynamiikka.  Tarkastelun 
perusteella  markkinataloudessa hiilidioksidipäästöt  tuottavat  ulkoisia haittoja  joita  on 
verotettava  riippumatta  siitä,  ovatko  ne peräisin  fossiilisista polttoaineista vai puun 
poltosta.  Hiilen sitoutuminen metsäbiomassaan tuottaa  ulkoisia  hyötyjä,  minkä 
seurauksena metsänomistajia  on tuettava  suhteessa metsään sitoutuvan hiilen määrään. 
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1 Introduction  
Utilization  of  fossil fuels in energy production  results  in carbon being  emitted  into the 
atmosphere  and thus  contributes to atmospheric  C0 2 accumulation and climate  
change.  In  addition to  fossil fuels, a considerable amount of  C0 2  emissions  is  caused 
by  deforestation. The  annual emission due to deforestation is  approximately  2*l0 9  
tons of  C0 2 ,  compared  with approximately  6  *10
9
 tons caused  by  the burning  of  fossil  
fuels  (Smith  et  al.,  1993). 
In contrast to deforestation,  growing  forests  store carbon. According  to the 
estimates  in Kauppi  <k Tomppo (1993),  the contribution of forest growth  to net 
national emissions varies considerably  between different European  countries. In 
EFTA countries the net accumulation of carbon due to forest growth is about 
49-96%  of  the emissions deriving  from the fossil  fuels of  the  same  countries.  At  the 
EC+EFTA  level  the figure  is  smaller,  7—14%.  Extreme examples  are  countries like 
Sweden and Finland,  where  accumulation of  carbon may exceed emissions from  fossil 
fuels by  25—50%.  At  the  other extreme are Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK,  
where accumulation of  carbon in  forest  growth  is  negligible.  The role of forests  has  led 
to the concept  of net national emissions,  which  defines the net impact  of  each 
individual country  on the accumulation of  C0 2  in the atmosphere.  According  to the 
Climate Convention,  each country  should  report  "emissions  by  sources  and removals 
by  sinks".  Each country  may have the  freedom to choose efficient  strategies  for 
controlling  its  net national  emissions. 
International cooperation  to slow down carbon accumulation in the 
atmosphere  may require  emission taxation or markets for emission permits.  
According  to the concept  of  net  national emissions,  individual countries should pay  
for permits  or  should be  taxed according  to their net emissions. This has led to a 
discussion of  how carbon emissions  arising  from the burning  of  wood should be taxed 
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at  the national  level.  The most common  argument is  that,  in contrast to fossil fuels,  
C0
2
 emissions caused by  the  burning  of  wood should be neglected  in carbon taxation 
because sustainable forestry  guarantees  that the same amount of carbon will  
accumulate in new year classes  of  growing  forests.  Accordingly,  it is argued  that  
forest owners  need not be subsidized. l 
The purpose  of this paper is to  study the national C0 2  
taxation problem  using  
a dynamic  general  equilibrium  model. The model contains the stock  of  capital  and 
forests as state variables. 2 The social planner  or perfectly  competitive  markets  
determine optimal  consumption,  capital  accumulation,  the use  of  forest  as  fuel,  the 
use  of wood  as raw material,  and the import  of fossil  fuels  from  abroad.  The economy 
buys  C0 2 emission permits  or  pays  taxes according  to net national emissions.  The 
problem  is  to find a tax/subsidy  programme which equalizes  the outcome of  perfectly  
competitive  markets  and social optimum.  
The analysis  shows that, because forests  are  capable  of  storing  carbon,  it is  
optimal  to increase the size  of  the forest stock  beyond  the level which  maximizeses 
the  conventional  raw  material  net benefits.  In a  decentralized  economy this  requires  
that forest  owners  should  produce  positive  externalities.  This is  impossible  without  
subsidies which  make the stock of growing forest a more profitable capital  
investment.  It is  shown that this subsidy  must equal  the amount of  carbon stored by  
a given stand multiplied by  the internationally  determined carbon tax.  In addition, it  
is  necessary  to tax  C0 2  emissions  independently  of whether they  originate  from fossil  
fuels or  wood. However,  when wood is  used in durable commodities the optimal  tax 
per  carbon content may be  lower than in  the case  where wood is  burned. 
The paper is  organized  as  follows. Section  2  presents  the dynamic  optimization  
1 The ideas in "Hiilidionsiditoimikunnan mietintö, 1991" come close  to these 
views. 
2 The model is an application of the work presented  in Tahvonen and 
Kuuluvainen 1993. 
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model and analyses  the properties  of  social  optimum.  Section 3 presents  the optimal  
subsidy/tax  programme and considers various special  cases.  Section 4 concludes the  
paper. 
2 Carbon  taxation  and  optimal accumulation  of  the  forest  stock  
According  to Kauppi  and  Tomppo  (1993),  the total annual flow of  carbon can  be 
divided into three flow components:  (1)  the removal of carbon due to forest 
harvesting,  (2)  the accumulation of  carbon in  the forest soil  (detritus  formation),  and 
(3)  the net accumulation of  carbon in  living  forest biomass (Figure  1). 
Let  us  denote the  timber harvest  by  h(t)  and the stock  of  harvestable timber 
by  x(t). Both are  measured in carbon units. The growth of harvestable biomass is  
given by  F[x(t)]. F[-] is assumed to be strictly concave  with the properties  
F[o]=F[x(t)]=o, where x  is  some maximum level of  forest stock  given  the land area 
allocated to forestry. 3  Because  of  detritus formation  forests  also  store carbon in the 
forest soil.  
Thus the  total flow of  carbon exceeds the level of  carbon which is  accumulated 
in the harvestable biomass.  The total flow of  carbon is  denoted by  /xF[x(t)],  where 
fj>  1. The accumulation of  carbon in the forest soil  is  thus (/f—  l)F[x(t)] 4 . Finally,  the 
accumulation of  carbon in harvestable forest biomass equals  x=F[x(t)]—h(t).  
3 This formulation of  the  growth  function  does not separate  the year  classes  of  
forest biomass. In spite  of this,  it is frequently  used in forest economics 
especially  in two—period  models  on forest taxation and the  behaviour of forest 
owners;  see  e.g.  Kuuluvainen,  1989,  and  Ovaskainen,  1993. 
4 A more accurate description  of  carbon accumulation in  the forest  soil  requires  
more  state variables than  is  used in this analysis.  The case  fi>l approximates  
the  possibility  that the  pool  of carbon in soil is  increasing  and is  not  in a 
steady  state. 
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Figure  1. Flows of carbon in forestry.  F[x(t)] is the growth of harvestable 
timber, x(t)  is the harvestable biomass,  (µ-l)F[x(t)]  gives the 
accumulation of carbon in the forest soil,  µ≥1, and h(t) is  the 
rate of  harvest  (modified  from Kauppi  and Tomppo,  1993).  
Let r  denote the  tax level  per  ton of  C0 2  emissions  or  the  price  of  a permit  per  ton  of  
emissions. The level  of r  is  determined in international negotiations  and is  taken here 
to  be exogenously  given.  For simplicity  ris  assumed to be constant in time. q(t)  
denotes the  level of imported  fossil fuel consumption  in terms of  C0 2  emissions. The 
domestic forest stock  can be consumed as  fuel or  as  raw material by  the wood 
processing  industry.  The former  is  denoted by  hi(t)  and  the latter by  h2(t),  both in 
terms  of  the carbon content. Because part  of  the carbon content in h 2(t)  will  remain 
in forest products,  the emissions from h 2 (t)  are denoted by oh 2(t)  where a<l. 
According  to the concept  of  net national emissions the international authority  takes 
into account  the amount of  carbon which accumulates  in the unharvested forest stock  
and in the forest soil. Thus the  net payments  in the form of  C0 2 tax or  emission 
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permits  for  a  given  country  equal
s :  
Denote the stock  of the productive  capital  by  k(t).  The  production  function of  the 
economy is P[k(t),hi(t),q(t),h 2 (t)]. P[-] is assumed  to be strictly  concave  and 
increasing  with all  arguments.  In addition,  all  cross  derivatives are assumed  to be 
positive.  These assumptions  imply  that  there are  substitution  possibilities  between all  
inputs  but that no inputs are perfect  substitutes. 6 Let c(t)  denote the level of 
consumption  and TJ[c(t)]  a  strictly  concave  utility  function  with lim U'[c(t)]=oo. The 
t-* 0 
problem  of  the social planner  is  to 7  
The current value Hamiltonian and the necessary conditions for optimum are  
(Seierstad  and Sydsaeter,  1987,  theorem 3.12):  
5 In the case  where the international agreement  specifies  an upper limit to net 
national  emissions r  may be  interpreted  as  a Lagrangian  multiplier.  
6 It may be possible  that wood and fossil  fuels  are  perfect  substitutes  in energy 
production.  In this case the production function may take the form: 
P(k,hi+q,h 2 ). Using  this  formulation does not change  the main results  of  the 
analysis.  
7 The  time arguments  are  neglected  for  the  sake of  notational simplicity.  
r{q(t)+h 1(t)+oh 2(t)—/iF[x(t)]}. (1)  
OD 
maximize  W  = U(c)e (2)  
{q,  
h
 i ,h 2 ,  c  } q 
s.t. k=P(k,hi,q,h 2 )—  c—p 3 q—r[q+hi+ah2 k(0)=k 0 , (3)  
x=F(x)-hi-h
2 , x(0)=x 0 , (4) 
q>o, (5)  
hi>o, (6)  
h
2
>o. (7)  
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and  conditions  (3)-(7).  
Before studying  the  optimal  tax/subsidy  programme let us  consider the basic  
properties  of the optimal  solution. Equations  (10)—(12)  determine the optimal  levels 
of wood and coal  utilization  as  functions of  the shadow prices  for capital  and the 
forest
 
stock.
 Differentiating  
the
 system  (10) —(12)  totally  gives:  hi=hi(<,o,A,k), 
h
l(^<o,  
hl
A
>o
'  hlk >o,  h2= h2(^ A.k )>  h h2A >O,  h2k >o  and %<0>  qA>0'  
qj
c
>o.  Equation  (9)  determines the  level  of  consumption  as  a  function  of  the shadow  
price  of capital.  Denote this by  c=c(A).  Now we can  write the Modified Hamiltonian 
Dynamic  System:  
Let us  use Soreger's  (1989)  corollary  2c.  It states  that the system  is globally  stable  for 
l=U(c)+A[P(k,hi,q,h 2 )-c-p 3q-7-[q+h I+ah 2-/iF(x)]+^[F(x)-h 1-h 2], (8)  
dy/<9c=U'(c)-A=o, (9) 
ii
(k,hI,q, 1,q,h 2 hisJf/shi=o,  hi>o, (10)  
cM/dh
2
=AP,  (k 3 hi,q,h 2 )— h 2 <%/3h 2 =o,  h2>o, (11)  
2 
OT/öq=P
q
(k,h I ,q,h
2
)-p 3 --r<0I  qOT/öq=o,  q>o, (12)  
Ä=A[6-P
k
(k,h l ,q,h
2
)], (13)  
<p=—\TfiF  '(x)+i/>[<s-F '(x)], (14)  
k=P[k,h l(^,A,k),q((/?,A,k),h 2(^A,k)]—c(A)  
+  ah 2(^A,k)-/xF(x)],  
x=F(x)-h l(<p,A,k)-h
2
(<p,A,k) ) 
Ä=A{s-P
k
[k,hi((p,A,k),q(^A,k),h 2((/7,A,k)]},  
<p=—XtF  '(x)+y>[<s-F'(x)].  
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bounded solutions (i.e. it includes a unique saddle point steady state) if the 
"curvature matrix", 
where 1* is the maximized Hamiltonian,  \ =k,x and j=A,<p, is  negative  definite. The 
matrices l'\\ and #*jj are  negative  definite with negative  eigenvalues  by  the strict  
concavity  assumptions  on P(k,h 1,q,h 2),  U(c)  and F(x).  This  implies  that the matrix C  
is  negative  definite given  that the rate  of discount is small  enough  (Brock  and 
Scheinkman,  1976) and  furthermore that with small  rates  of  discount the steady  state 
equilibrium  is unique  and globally  stable for bounded solutions. This means that 
given  the initial levels  of  capital  and the forest stock,  the approach  path  toward the 
saddle point  steady  state is  the  optimal  solution for this  model. The existence  of  this 
solution can be shown by  using  the  existence thorems for ordinary differential 
equations  (see e.g.  Brock and Malliaris,  1989,  theorems 4.1 and 6.1). 
At  the steady  state ip=o,  i.e. (equation  14). Given 
<s>o,  the size  of  the steady  state forest stock  cannot be so  large  that  F  '(x)<o  because 
this  would imply  that ip>o.  Correspondingly,  the steady  state forest stock  cannot be 
so  small that 6-F'(x)<o  because this  would imply  y><o. Thus  the optimal  size  of the 
forest  stock  is  somewhere between the stock level  where marginal  growth equals  the 
rate of  discount and the stock  level which implies maximum sustainable yield.  
However,  if  <s=o  the  optimal  steady  state  stock  size  equals  the level with a maximum 
sustainable  yield.  Using  equations  tp=  0, (14) and (10),  the steady  state forest  stock  
can  be  characterized  by The term  r/iF'(x)/^^^-)—r] 
represents  the stock  effect.  In this  case  it equals  the decrease in carbon taxes  due to a  
marginal  increase in the growing  forest stock  divided by  the (net)  productivity  of  a 
marginal  unit of  wood used in energy production  (i.e.  the investment costs  for the 
c_ [**  ii N
-U/2)I1  «•-
 -(fi/2) -**jj  
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marginal  forest capital).  At  the steady  state  F(x)—hi—h 2=o which implies that 
r[hi+ah
2
—/xF(x)]<o.  This means that at the steady  state the net taxation from 
forest—based emissions is  negative  (recall  that a<l  and /x>  1). This follows  because 
even when the harvestable forest stock is  constant carbon is  accumulating  in durable 
forest products  and in the forest soil ß .  If  the rate of  fossil  fuel utilization is low 
enough the carbon taxation of  the given  country  may be negative  i.e. the country  
may receive  net revenues  from carbon taxation. 
Let  us  next consider how the  socially  optimal  solution can  be  implemented  in 
a decentralized economy using  taxes and subsidies.  
3 Decentralized  solutions  with  domestic  taxes  and  subsidies  
This section will show that the  optimal  outcome studied above can  be implemented  in 
a  decentralized economy by  taxing  all  carbon emissions  at  the international tax  rate r  
and by  subsidizing  the forest  sector  and individual forest  owners  at  the rate equal  to 
the  value of  removed carbon,  i.e.  at  the  rate r/iF(x).  
Assume  that the economy consists of a representative  consumer, a  
representative  firm, a representative  forest  owner  and  the  government.  The consumer  
maximizes  the present  value utility  from consumption  by  optimal  allocation of  his  
capital  stock  between consumption  and savings  (the  amount of labour sold by  the  
consumer  is  taken to be fixed).  The consumer  rents  capital  to  the representative  firm 
at  the market interest rate r  and  as the owner  of the  firm he also  receives  the profits  
7T.  The firm is  a price  taker  and maximizes its  instantaneous profits  and pays  carbon 
taxes as part of the production  costs. The forest owner  maximizes rent from 
8 However,  recall  footnote 3.  
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harvesting  his  forest plus the subsidies  from the government.  
The problem  of  the representative  consumer  is  to 
00 
maximize W= U(c)e (15)  
M o 
s.t.  k=7r+rk—c,  k(O)=k 0 . (16)  
Denote the consumer's shadow price  for capital  by a. The necessary (interior)  
conditions for optimum are: 
U '(c)—cr=o, (17)  
a—a(s—x), (18)  
and conditions (16). 
Denote the price  for  wood as an energy source by  pi and as  a raw  material  in 
processing  by  p 2 .  The problem  of  the  firm  is  to 
maximize 7r=P(k,hi,q,h 2 )-rk-(p I+r)hi—(p 2+ar)h 2—(r+p3)q. (19)  
{k ,h  i ,q,h 2}  
Necessary  (interior)  conditions for optimum  are:  
37r/ök=P
k
(k,h 1,q,h 2 )-r=o, (20)  
Ö7r/3h l=P
hi
(k,h 1 ,q,h 2 )-pi-r=o, (21)  
Ö7r/3h 2=P h  (k,h 1,q,h 2 )-ar-p2=o ! (22)  
2 
37r/öq=Pq(k,h 1,q,h 2 )—p 3 —r=o. (23)  
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Finally,  the forest  owner  aims  to 
00 
maximize Wf— [pihH-p 2
h
2+r/fF(x)])e (24) 
{hl,  h  2 } g 
s.t. x=F(x)-h!-h 2 ,  x(0)=x 0 , (25)  
hi>o,  h 2 >o. (26)  
Denote by  <f>  the shadow price  (stumpage price)  for wood. The necessary (interior)  
conditions for the forest owner are:  
(27)  
cffl/3h
2=p 2—o<O,  
h
2 o#/dh 2 =O,  h 2 >o, (28)  
o=-r/iF'(x)+o[(s-F'(x)], (29)  
and conditions (25)—(26).  
Now we can  compare the necessary conditions in the planner's  problem  with 
the conditions of  the  decentralized economy.  (20)  shows  that  r=Pj
[
(-).  Comparing  (9)  
and (17)  suggests  that X=a. This implies  that (13)  *=> (18),  i.e.  that they are 
equivalent.  Define  <p=<p/\  and pi=<p/\.  This implies  that  (21) <=*  (10)  and that (22)  
<=> (11).  The equivalence  between (23)  and (12)  is  obvious. Substituting  ir  by  (19)  
from  (16)  implies  that  (16)<=>(3).  Finally,  (25)<=>(4).  Thus the decentralized solution 
with the proposed  taxation/subsidy  programme  equals  the pareto  optimal  solution of  
the  social planner.  
Because the growing  biomass decreases the net expenditures  from pollution  
taxation optimality  requires  that the accumulation of  the forest stock  exceeds  the 
accumulation  without  the C0
2
 taxation. To  include the  appropriate  incentive in the 
forest owner's problem requires  a subsidy  which depends on the rate of carbon 
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accumulation of  the growing  forest.  
Wood can  cause  different amounts of emissions  depending  on  how it is  utilized. 
As  it  is  an energy source,  emissions will be released immediately.  In the form of  
durable commodities and paper products  the  decay  may take years  or decades but,  if  
used in  construction,  wood can  store  carbon much longer.  These differences require  
that carbon taxation must also be differentiated over different utilization purposes. 
This is reflected in the carbon taxes,  which equal  t for wood used in energy  
production  and ar  for  wood used as  a  raw material  for  other  purposes. Because  of  this 
the correct price  stucture cannot be created merely  by  subsidizing  the forest owners. 
4  Conclusions  
According  to the concept  of  net national emissions,  the role of  forest  as  carbon sinks  
must  be taken into account when the emission levels of individual countries are 
estimated.  If  different countries are  able to reach some kind  of agreement  for abating  
C0
2 emissions,  this agreement  can 
be implemented  by  using  emission taxes or  
markets  for emission permits.  This  raises  the question  of  how different countries 
should  control  forest harvesting  and the use of  wood as  an energy source at the 
national level. Common arguments  suggest  that if forests are  harvested at a 
sustainable  level,  the wood—based C0 2  emissions need not  be taxed and accordingly  
forest owners  need not be subsidized. The  analysis  of  this paper shows that the 
reverse  is true. The ability  of  forests  to decrease national expenditures  on  C0 2 
taxation increases the productivity  of unharvested  forests.  As a consequence, the 
steady  state level  of  the forest  stock  increases. In a decentralized economy this  means  
that  private  forest  owners  should produce  positive  externalities. This  is  not possible  
without subsidies to forest  owners.  An optimal  subsidy  equals  the (annual)  amount  of 
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carbon stored  by  a  given  forest stand multiplied  by  the international price of emission 
permits.  In addition to this,  optimality  requires  that  all  C0 2  emissions must be  taxed 
independently  of whether they  have their origin  in forests  or  fossil  fuels. 
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